Optimal Demand-Side Management for Joint Privacy-Cost Optimization with
  Energy Storage by Giaconi, Giulio et al.
Optimal Demand-Side Management for Joint
Privacy-Cost Optimization with Energy Storage
Giulio Giaconi and Deniz Gu¨ndu¨z
Imperial College London, London, UK
{g.giaconi, d.gunduz}@imperial.ac.uk
H. Vincent Poor
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
poor@princeton.edu
Abstract—The smart meter (SM) privacy problem is addressed
together with the cost of energy for the user. It is assumed that
a storage device, e.g., an electrical battery, is available to the
user, which can be utilized both to achieve privacy and to reduce
the energy cost by modifying the energy consumption profile.
Privacy is measured via the mean squared-error between the SM
readings, which are reported to the utility provider (UP), and a
target load; while time-of-use pricing is considered for energy cost
calculation. The optimal trade-off between the achievable privacy
and the energy cost is characterized by taking into account the
limited capacity of the battery as well as the capability to sell
energy to the UP. Extensive numerical simulations are presented
to evaluate the performance of the proposed strategy for different
system settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart meters (SMs) are the key component of the next
generation of power grids, the so-called smart grid, since they
enable the monitoring of a user’s power consumption in almost
real time. SMs allow a utility provider (UP), i.e., the entity that
sells energy to customers, to determine the electricity cost
dynamically, and a distribution system operator (DSO), i.e.,
the entity that manages the power grid, to better manage the
grid itself. In addition, SMs allow users to better monitor their
electricity consumption, integrate renewable energy sources
into the grid, and sell surplus energy to the UP.
However, because of the high accuracy and granularity of
the SM readings, SMs also entail serious privacy implications.
By using non-intrusive appliance load monitoring techniques it
is possible to infer user’s activities and behaviors, and deter-
mine, for example, a user’s presence at home, her religious
beliefs, disabilities, illnesses, and even which TV channel
she is watching [1]. To address these issues, several methods
have been proposed so far, including data obfuscation [2],
data aggregation [3], and data anonymization [4]. However,
a disadvantage of these approaches is that the DSO could
potentially embed additional sensors to monitor the energy
requested by a user, without fully relying on SM readings.
Additionally, data obfuscation methods misreport the real
energy consumption, thus preventing the DSO from accurately
monitoring the grid states and rapidly reacting to problems
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such as outages or energy theft. Another approach is to directly
modify the user’s energy consumption, called the input load,
rather than simply modifying the data reported to the UP,
called the output load. Thus, the aim is to make the output load
as different from the input load as possible, by, for example,
filtering energy via a rechargeable energy storage device, i.e.,
a battery, as studied in [5]–[10].
In this paper, we adopt the latter approach and consider
the presence of a battery which can store energy from the
grid to partially satisfy a user’s energy demand. Our goal is
to minimize the energy cost for the user while keeping the
information leakage to the energy provider minimal. While a
widely accepted definition of privacy is still elusive, one can
suggest that privacy is achieved in a smart metering system
when it is not possible to distinguish a specific appliance load
from the total power consumption [11]. From this perspective,
a high degree of privacy can be achieved by flattening the
power consumption around a constant value, as considered in
[10]. However, a completely constant consumption may not be
practically viable and convenient, since, for example, the cost
may vary greatly during the system operation due to time-of-
use tariffs. Also, it is not clear what the advantage of such
a policy would be, as compared, for example, to the case of
having multiple levels of constant consumption.
For these reasons, in this paper we consider a more general
and flexible target load profile compared to [10], and jointly
minimize the cost of energy and the mean squared-error
between the SM readings and the target load. Moreover, we
also consider the possibility of selling energy to the UP as a
way to further lower the cost and improve the privacy. We
impose the target load to remain constant over each price
period, since it is reasonable to assume that a user may prefer
to draw more energy during off-peak periods (when the price is
lower) as compared to the peak price period, and this behavior
would not necessarily leak more information about the user.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we present the system model, while in Section III
we analyze the proposed target load analytically. Numerical
results are presented in Section IV, while conclusions are
drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the discrete time system model depicted in
Fig. 1, where each time index t represents a time slot (TS)
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Fig. 1. The system model. Xt, Yt and Yt −Xt are the user input load, the
output load, and the energy exchanged with the battery at time t, respectively.
The dashed line represents the meter readings being reported to the UP.
for 1 ≤ t ≤ N . For each TS t, the input load is Xt ∈ X
and the output load is Yt ∈ Y . We assume the presence of a
rechargeable energy storage device, i.e., a battery, of capacity
Bmax, which is empty at t = 0 and can be used both to filter
the input load to provide privacy to the user, and to shift energy
intake from the grid to minimize cost. The energy management
unit determines how much energy to draw from the grid, Yt,
and how much energy to exchange with the battery, Yt −Xt.
The time duration between two consecutive measurements is
δi , ti − ti−1, which is assumed to be constant for the sake
of simplicity. The total working time of the system is thus
T = δN , and Xt is the user’s energy demand occurring in
time interval [(t − 1)δ, tδ]. Let Bt ∈ [0, Bmax] denote the
battery state-of-charge (SOC) at the end of TS t. The battery
is charging if Yt − Xt > 0, discharging if Yt − Xt < 0, or
remains in the same SOC if Yt − Xt = 0. We do not allow
wasting grid energy; that is, there are no battery overflows,
i.e.,
t∑
τ=1
(Yτ −Xτ )δ ≤ Bmax, t = 1, 2, . . . N. (1)
While additional energy can be stored in the battery for
future use, we do not allow energy rescheduling or demand
shifting, i.e., user’s energy requests are always satisfied as they
occur:
t∑
τ=1
Yτ ≥
t∑
τ=1
Xτ , t = 1, 2, . . . N. (2)
In particular, (2) is also implicitly verified by the battery
SOC evolution equation:
Bt+1 = Bt + Yt+1 −Xt+1. (3)
A further constraint is represented by the maximum amount
of power with which the battery can be charged or discharged,
denoted by Pˆc and Pˆd, respectively. Thus, we have
Yt ≤ Xt + Pˆc, t = 1, 2, . . . N, (4)
Yt ≥ Xt − Pˆd, t = 1, 2, . . . N. (5)
Here we assume that the battery has perfect efficiency, i.e.,
no leakages, to understand the optimal cost-privacy trade-
off in an ideal setting. The effects of battery inefficiencies
and degradations may be taken into account by introducing a
constant rate leakage for the energy stored in the battery, or by
imposing a further cost whenever the battery is used, within
the framework studied here.
At first we do not consider selling energy to the UP, i.e.,
the energy drawn from the grid is always non-negative
Yt ≥ 0, t = 1, 2, . . . N. (6)
Later we will lift this constraint. Given (Xt, Bt) = (xt, bt),
Bmax and the constraints (4)-(6), the set of feasible energy
requests at time t is
Y¯t(xt, bt) ,
{
yt ∈ Y :[
xt −min{bt, Pˆd}
]+
≤ yt ≤ xt + min{Pˆc, Bmax − bt}
}
,
(7)
where [a]+ = a if a > 0, and 0 otherwise.
When t = N no energy should be left unused in the battery;
that is, we impose
N∑
t=1
Yt =
N∑
t=1
Xt. (8)
We aim at designing an energy management policy that
decides on the amount of energy to request from the UP at each
TS t while satisfying (2)-(8). We consider an offline setting, in
which the input load XN and the cost of energy CN are known
beforehand and our goal is to jointly minimize the information
leaked about the user’s energy consumption as well as the
cost the user incurs to purchase energy from the UP. While
non-causal knowledge of the price is a realistic assumption
in today’s energy networks, non-causal knowledge of power
consumption is valid for appliances such as refrigerators, boil-
ers, heating and electric vehicles, whose energy consumption
can be accurately predicted over certain finite time frames.
Energy management with imperfect input load predictions will
be studied in a future work. We also remark that the solution
of the offline problem yields meaningful lower bounds on the
performance of the more general online setting. In fact, in the
offline setting, the knowledge of future energy consumption
enables the user to better match the output with the target load,
thus leading to the minimum amount of information leaked to
the UP.
We measure privacy as the mean squared-error between Y N
and a target load WN over T TSs, i.e.,
P , 1
N
N∑
t=1
(Yt −Wt)2, (9)
according to which, perfect privacy is achieved when Yt = Wt,
∀t. When energy cannot be sold to the UP, Wt is non-negative,
i.e.,
Wt ≥ 0, t = 1, 2, . . . N. (10)
The average cost incurred by the user during time T is
C , 1
N
N∑
t=1
CtYt, (11)
L(x, λ, ν) = 1
N
M∑
i=1
[ t
c(i)∑
t=t
c(i−1)
α
(
Yt−W (i)
)2
+(1−α)YtC(i)
]
+
N∑
t=1
λ
(1)
t
t∑
τ=1
(Xτ−Yτ )+
N∑
t=1
λ
(2)
t
{[ t∑
τ=1
(Yτ−Xτ )δ
]
−Bmax
}
+
N∑
t=1
λ
(3)
t (Yt −Xt − Pˆc) +
N∑
t=1
λ
(4)
t (Xt − Yt − Pˆd)−
N∑
t=1
λ
(5)
t Yt −
CM∑
i=1
λ
(6)
i W
(i) + ν(1)
N∑
t=1
(Yt −Xt). (12)
Fig. 2. Time-of-use tariff. tc(i) , for i = 1, . . . ,M − 1, are the time instants
at which the price of energy changes, while tc(0) = 0 and tc(M) = tN are
the extremes of the time interval considered.
where Ct is the cost of energy at time t, which is determined
by the specific time-of-use tariff employed by the UP.
Compared to [10] where the target load is set to be a
constant function over time, in the following section we
consider a more general target load, specifically a function
which assumes a constant value for each price period.
III. TARGET LOAD AS A PIECEWISE CONSTANT FUNCTION
In this section the objective of the optimization problem
is to determine both the optimal target {W ∗}Nt=1 and the
optimal output load {Y ∗}Nt=1, so that the average squared-
distance between them is minimized. The target load is set to
be piecewise constant over price periods. We argue that such
an output load trades off privacy with cost. Multiple target
values for energy intake from the grid intuitively reveal more
information about the user’s real energy consumption behavior
compared to a single constant target value. However, it also
provides more flexibility to reduce the cost and to match the
target load, providing a trade-off between cost and privacy.
Let C(i) be the cost of the energy purchased from the UP
during the i-th price period, where 1 ≤ i ≤ M and M is the
total number of price periods during time T . The i-th price
period spans from tc(i−1) to tc(i) , and N (i) , (tc(i)−tc(i−1))/δ
is the number of TSs contained within price period i. Fig. 2
depicts this model. Let W (i) be the constant target load for the
i-th time period. Given the nature of the objective functions
and the constraints, pairs of (P , C) form a convex region and
the optimal points can be characterized by the Pareto boundary
of this region. Then, our problem can be cast as a weighted
combination of privacy (9) and cost (11), i.e.,
min
Yt,W (i)
1
N
M∑
i=1
[ t
c(i)∑
t=t
c(i−1)
α(Yt −W (i))2 + (1− α)YtC(i)
]
,
(13)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the weighting parameter between privacy
and cost, according to which if α = 0 only cost of energy
is minimized, whereas if α = 1 only information leakage is
minimized.
Based on (13) and the constraints (1)-(2), (4)-(6), (8) and
(10), we define the Lagrangian function as (12) shown at the
top of the page, where λ(j)t ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ 5 and 1 ≤
t ≤ N , λ(6)i ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ CM , and ν(1) ≥ 0 are the
Lagrange multipliers. The corresponding slackness conditions
are imposed on the inequality constraints:
λ
(1)
t
t∑
τ=1
(Xτ − Yτ ) = 0, t = 1, . . . , N, (14)
λ
(2)
t
{[ t∑
τ=1
(Yτ −Xτ )δ
]
−Bmax
}
= 0, t = 1 . . . , N,
(15)
λ
(3)
t (Yt −Xt − Pˆc) = 0, t = 1, . . . , N, (16)
λ
(4)
t (Xt − Yt − Pˆd) = 0, t = 1, . . . , N, (17)
λ
(5)
t Yt = 0, t = 1, . . . , N, (18)
λ
(6)
i W
(i) = 0, i = 1, . . . , CM . (19)
We then apply the Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions
and set the gradient of the Lagrangian to zero, i.e.,
∂L
∂Yt
=
2α(Yt −W (i))
N
+
(1− α)C(i)
N
+
N∑
τ=t
(λ(2)τ δ − λ(1)τ )
+ λ
(3)
t − λ(4)t − λ(5)t + ν(1) = 0, (20)
∂L
∂W (i)
= −
t
c(i)∑
t=t
c(i−1)
2α(Yt −W (i))
N
− λ(6)i = 0. (21)
From (20), we obtain the optimal value for Yt as
Y ∗t =
[
Nat
2α
+W (i)∗ − C˜(i)
]+
, t = 1, . . . , N, (22)
where at =
∑N
τ=t(λ
(1)
τ − λ(2)τ δ) − λ(3)t + λ(4)t + λ(5)t − ν(1)
and C˜(i) = (1−α)C
(i)
2α . From (21), we obtain the optimal value
(a) Bmax,1 = 4. (b) Bmax,2 = 8.
Fig. 3. A simplified scenario with a piecewise constant target load.
for W (i) as
W (i)∗ =
[
Nλ
(6)
i
2αN (i)
+
∑t
c(i)
t=t
c(i−1)
Y ∗t
N (i)
]+
, 1 ≤ i ≤M. (23)
The optimal solution (22) resembles the classical water-
filling algorithm that determines the optimal power allocation
for Gaussian parallel channels under a total power constraint
[12]. However, differently from the classical water-filling
formulation, here the water level, Y ∗t + C˜
(i) = Nat2α +W
(i)∗,
is not constant, but varies over time due to the instantaneous
constraints. The optimal target for price period i, (23), is a
function of the Lagrange multipliers and of the mean of the
optimal output loads in the same price period.
The simple scenario illustrated in Fig. 3 offers some intu-
ition about the optimal solution and its water-filling interpre-
tation. We consider two price periods, C(1) = 1 and C(2) = 3,
two batteries of parameters Bmax,1 = 4 kWh, Pˆc,1 = Pˆd,1 = 2
kW and Bmax,2 = 8 kWh, Pˆc,2 = Pˆd,2 = 4 kW, respectively,
N = 4 and α = 0.5. The input load is X4 = [1, 4, 2, 5]
kW. For the sake of simplicity, we consider δi = 1, so
that power and energy can be used interchangeably. Fig. 3a,
shows the optimal solution and water levels for Bmax,1. Since
C(1) < C(2), more energy is requested from the grid during
the first price period and stored in the battery to partially
satisfy the user’s energy consumption during the second price
period. However, the energy that can be stored is limited not
only by the battery capacity Bmax but also by the peak power
constraint Pˆc,1 (4). In the first TS it is indeed Pˆc,1 that limits
the output load. We have Y ∗1 = X1 + Pˆc,1 and the battery
SOC at the end of the TS is B1 = Pˆc,1 = 2. The water
level for t = 1 is given by Y ∗1 + C˜
(1) = 4a12α +W
(1)∗, where
a1 =
∑4
τ=1(λ
(1)
τ −λ(2)τ δ)−λ(3)1 +λ(4)1 +λ(5)1 −ν(1), and W (1)∗
is computed jointly with Y ∗1 and Y
∗
2 (23). In the second TS,
the output load is limited by both the charging peak power
constraint and the battery capacity, i.e., Y ∗2 = X2 + Pˆc,1, and
TABLE I
SPECIFICATIONS OF THE BATTERIES CONSIDERED IN THE SIMULATIONS.
Residential Battery Capacity(kWh)
Charging Peak
Power (kW)
Discharging Peak
Power (kW)
Powervault G200-LI-4KWH [14] 4 1.2 1.4
Tesla Powerwall 2 [15] 13.5 5 5
B2 = Bmax = 4. In the third TS, Y ∗3 = 0, which does not vio-
late the discharging peak power constraint as X3 = Pˆd,1 = 2,
and B3 = 2. In the last TS, Y ∗4 = X4 − Pˆd,1 = 3 and
the battery becomes empty. Fig. 3b shows that by increasing
Bmax, Pˆc and Pˆd, it is possible to further reduce the variance
of the output load from the target and the cost of energy.
A. Selling Energy to the Grid
Here we consider the possibility of selling energy to the UP
in order to further improve the user’s privacy and save costs.
By allowing this, the UP can practically utilize user devices
as distributed energy storage. Thus, we lift constraints (6) and
(10), and we have
Yt :
{
> 0, if energy is purchased from grid,
< 0, if energy is sold to grid.
(24)
Without loss of generality, the price of selling energy to the
grid is equal to the price of buying energy from it, i.e., we
implement the net metering approach, according to which the
user only needs a single SM, which can measure bi-directional
energy flows [13].
The set of feasible energy requests at time t is given by
Y˜t(xt, bt) ,
{
yt ∈ Y :
xt −min{bt, Pˆd} ≤ yt ≤ xt + min{Pˆc, Bmax − bt}
}
. (25)
The optimization problem is expressed as (13) and the La-
grangian is similar to (12) without considering the constraints
corresponding to λ(5)t and λ
(6)
i . The slackness conditions
follow similarly, and by applying the KKT conditions, we
obtain the following optimal values for Yt and W (i):
Y ∗t =
Nat
2α
+W (i)∗ − C˜(i), ∀t, (26)
W (i)∗ =
∑t
c(i)
t=t
c(i−1)
Y ∗t
N (i)
, ∀i, (27)
where at =
∑N
τ=t(λ
(1)
τ − λ(2)τ δ)− λ(3)t + λ(4)t − ν(1).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we evaluate numerically the performance
achieved when using the piecewise constant target and com-
pare it with the constant energy consumption target in [10].
We note that we also include the peak power constraints (4)-
(5) and the total energy constraint (8). We use real power
consumption traces retrieved from the UK Dale dataset [16],
which has a time resolution of 6 seconds. For our simulations,
we convert the dataset readings to a time resolution of 1
minute to reduce the computational complexity. We adopt two
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(a) Constant target, α = 0.1.
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(b) Piecewise constant target, α = 0.1.
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(c) Constant target, α = 0.9.
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(d) Piecewise constant target, α = 0.9.
Fig. 4. Input, target and output loads for a Powervault G200-LI-4KWH battery [14], α = 0.1 and α = 0.9.
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(a) Energy cannot be sold.
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(b) Energy can be sold.
Fig. 5. Comparison between allowing to sell energy to the UP and not
allowing it for the piecewise constant target load, a Tesla Powerwall 2 [15]
and α = 0.5.
commercial batteries, listed in Table I, in which the charging
(discharging) peak power denotes the amount of power that
the battery is able to input (output) sustainably over time. We
consider a time-of-use tariff currently being offered in the UK
[17], according to which the off-peak price is 4.99p per kWh
during 23:00 to 06:00, the medium price is 11.99p per kWh
during 06:00 to 16:00 and during 19:00 to 23:00, and the peak
price is 24.99p per kWh during 16:00 to 19:00.
Fig. 4 shows the input, output and target curves according
to the two target loads for α = 0.1 in Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b, and
α = 0.9 in Fig. 4c and Fig. 4d, respectively. These weights
are chosen to simulate users that are mainly interested in
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Fig. 6. P-C trade-off when using a Powervault G200-LI-4KWH battery.
minimizing their cost and maximizing privacy, respectively.
For these figures we adopt a Powervault G200-LI-4KWH
battery [14], and we assume that energy cannot be sold to
the UP. As the figures show, adopting a piecewise constant
target reduces the variance of the output load around the
target, thanks to the flexibility introduced by the piecewise
constant target function. However, because of the rather small
battery capacity, the demand peaks in the input load are
mostly revealed in the output load for both strategies. When
α = 0.1, since cost is more important than privacy, the battery
is charged more during the off-peak price period, and the
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Fig. 7. Privacy and cost versus battery capacity.
outputs for the two scenarios are more similar, since reducing
the variance from the target assumes less importance.
Fig. 5 shows the output and target loads when selling
energy to the UP is allowed, and a piecewise constant target is
considered along with a Tesla Powerwall 2 [15] and α = 0.5.
The results show that the target in this case can also have
negative values, which allow the user to sell energy to the
grid during the peak price period. Selling energy to the grid
further minimizes the costs and improves the overall trade-off.
Fig. 6 shows the trade-off between privacy and costs for the
two strategies by considering the Powervault G200-LI-4KWH
[14], and including the setting in which energy can be sold.
The figure confirms the results of Fig. 5 by showing that,
when energy can be sold, much lower costs are achieved for
the same level of privacy. As expected, adopting a piecewise
constant target leads to a much better privacy-cost trade-off
compared to the constant target, both when selling and not
selling energy.
Fig. 7a shows the degree of privacy that can be achieved for
different battery capacities for α = 1, while Fig. 7b shows the
hourly average energy cost with respect to Bmax for α = 0.
For these plots, we set Pˆc = Pˆd = Bmax/2 which is a
good approximation of the specifications of currently available
residential batteries. Fig. 7a shows that the information leakage
drops greatly even for relatively small battery sizes, and it
saturates at around Bmax = 8 kWh for all the strategies
considered. This shows that, if a user is only interested in
her privacy and has a medium-sized battery (≥ 6 kWh)
available, she can achieve almost zero output load variance
by using any of the target loads considered. Also, for smaller
battery capacities the piecewise constant target achieves better
performance. However, we remark here that having multiple
energy levels has an inherent information leakage which is
not captured solely by the load variance from the target. It is
noteworthy that selling energy does not improve privacy when
α = 1, since selling introduces negative target values which
are more difficult to match with the positive output load unless
a large battery is used. In the setting of Fig. 7b, as privacy
is not relevant, the only difference between the two targets is
due to allowing or not to sell energy to the UP. As one would
expect, the flexibility to sell energy to the grid can significantly
reduce the energy cost, and in principle the user can even make
a profit (corresponding to a negative cost in the figure).
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have studied the joint optimization of
privacy and cost for an SM system with a rechargeable
storage device. Privacy is measured via the mean squared-error
between the SM measurements and a target load profile, which
is set to be a piecewise constant function over price periods.
The user is allowed to sell excess energy to the UP. The op-
timal solution of the corresponding optimization problem has
been characterized, highlighting its water-filling interpretation.
Detailed numerical simulations have been presented, showing
the performance improvement of the proposed piecewise target
load as compared to a constant target load. Future work
will consider solving the corresponding online optimization
problem, including the possibility of load shifting, while
another interesting research direction is how to balance this
framework with UP’s interest in stabilizing the grid.
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